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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab
JosEPH F. l\fERRILL,
Plaintiff wnd

Respo~dent ~

vs.
BAILEY & SoNs CoMPANY, a· .corporation; SEYMOUR N. BAILEY
and ·EMMA Z. BAILEY, his wife;
J. \Y. SuMMERHAYs & SoNs
CoMPANY, a corporation; CoLoRADO ANIMAL BY-PRonucTs CoMPANY, a corpo:rntion; LEONA B.
WHITEHILL, administratrix of
the Estate of Bert N. Bailey,
D e c e a s e d ; RoBERT BAILEY
WHITEHILL; C. E. SuMMERHAYS
and J. J. SuMMERHAYs,

No. 6219

Defenda;nts and Appella;nts,
JoHN ScowcROFT & SoNs CoMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant not appealing.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE C.AS:E.
This is an appeal from a judgment or decree of the
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, Hon. P. C.
Evans, Judge thereof, in an action broug1ht by plaintiff
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
to quiet his title to 1certain real property in Salt Lake
City, and situate ·on the east side of 3rd West Street, Between 4th and 5th South 'Streets, in •said City, and known
and deseribed as the 1South 1f2 of Lot 3, Block 43, Blat
"A'', Salt Lake City Survey.
Plaintiff's complaint is in the usual form for an action to quiet title, and prays that title to the real estate
be quieted in plaintiff ag~inst "all claims of title to,
interest in or easement ·over or upon said Land asserted
by defendants or any of them,'' and also prays that defendants, and each of them, be restrained and enjoined
from driving trucks or other veihides over or upon, or
from otherwise taking possession of or using ''1all or any
portion of plaintiff's real estate for any purpose ·whatsoever," and that defendnats be required to remove from
plaintiff's land a ·Certain concre'te loading pl1atform and
ramp located there·on. (Ab. 1-4). Defendants separately
answered, denying plaintiff's daim of title to •said property unencumbered by any easement or right ~of way in
favor of defendants, and setting up their ·separate and
several -ownership of ·Certain parcels of land in Lot 2 of
said .Block and Plat a.fores1aid immediately a;dj.oining
plaintiff'·s said lands on the south, and alleging in detail
the ·creation and their ownership by grant, reservation
and use by the rcommon grantors of the parties and their
succes.sor·s in intere>st, of certain easements, rig1hts of way
and other rights and privileges, •Over, upon and in and
concerning plaintiff's said land, for the use and benefit
of defendants' ·said lands in Lot 2 1aforesaid (Ab. 5-56).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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3
Plaintiff replied to defendants' several answer's, admitting defendants to be the owners of the several parcels
of land adjoining plaintiff's property ~lleged in their
answers, and further admitting that defendants own, and
as alleged by them, are entitled to 'certain easements,
rights ·Of way and rights and privileges over, in and upon
plaintiff's land, for the use a.nd benefit of their ·said la~ds
in Lot 2, but denying that said easements, rights of way
a.nd privileges are as extensive as alleged by defendants;
and ·plaintiff further admitted 1Jhat when he became the
owner of ·his said land, there was constructed and open,
vi·sible, obvious and apparent, and in use by defendants
thereon, a railroad spur track and .certain lumber loading
platfonns; and he alleged that thereafter defendants removed a portion of such lumber loading platforms and
replaced the s:ame with a ·concrete platform and ramp
covering a larger area than that covered by the lumber
platform, and that the burden upon plaintiff's·1and was
thereby increased :and the servitude thereon attempted
to be enlarged, and prayed that plaintiff have judgment
as prayed in his complaint. (Ab. 56-75). Based upon
these replies, defendants moved the 'Court for a judgment on the pleadings upon the grounds, among others,
that the said replies are complete departures from plaintiff's complaint and constitute admissions of defendants'
defenses, claims and demands in their answers contained,
(Ab. 75-76), which m~tion was by the Court denie4, and
the case was tried to the Court without a jury, and resulted in a judgment or decree which, by its terms, and
in byentire
disregard
of forthe
grants
reservations
conSponsored
the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding
digitization
provided1and
by the Institute
of Museum and Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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4
tained in the deeds of defendants and their predecessor.s
in interest, excludes defendants from all ,of plaintiff's
property north of ·said railroad spur track, as well as
some ·south thereof, 1and restricts defendants' easements
and rights of way, and other rights and privileges over,
in and ·Concerning plaintiff's land, to use of said railroad
spur track situate thereon, and a small portion of plaintiff'·s ground to the south of such spur track (Ab. 169176). Tihe decree further requires the removal of the
entire ·concrete loading platform and ramp constructed
thereon pursuant to the right given and reserved in the
deeds of defendants and their predecessors in interest,
and it is to review this judgment or decree that this appeal has been perfected.
STATE.MENT OF F .ACTS.
As •shown by the abstract of title No. 77394 prepared
by t'he Utah Savings & Trust Abstract Company, wlhich
was received in evidence'· and will be herein referred to as
Exhibit "X", and 1as is als,o admitted by the pleadings
in the case, the grants and reservations, by which the
common grantors of plaintiff and de~endants granted and
reserved the ~easements and rights whiclh de\fendants
daim over and concerning plaintiff'·s land, are contained
in 'a 1certain deed dated August 9, 19·23, from Bert N.
Bailey and wife, and defendants, Seymour N. Bailey and
Emma Z. Bailey, his wife (Bert N. Bailey and Seymour
N. Bailey being the common g:mntor.s of plaintiff and
defendants ,of all of the property here involved), to deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fendant Bailey & Sons Company, and covering certain of
defendants' property in said Lot 2, and reading, so far
as the grant of the easements and rights in plaintiff's
land are concerned, as follows:
"together with the trackage privilege now in use
1at the North end of said property. * * *

* * '' Als,o a perpetual Right to tihe use
of the railroad spur together with the team, track
and auto drive along the North line thereof and
the platform for loading and unloading from vehides ~and cars, through and over a part of the
South 1;2 of Lot 3, of said Block and Plat as at
present constituted, with a Rig1ht to repair, reconstruct or rebuild t·he same as shall from time
to time become nece.ssary within its present location.
''Also a perpetlllal Right of Way for ingress,
egress and regress f.nr all purposes over the following strip of ground, to-wit: Commencing 99
feet East of the Northwest corner of said Lot 2,
running thence South 76 feet; thence West 403~
feet; tJhence North lOlJ2 feet; thence E·ast 303~
feet; thence North 65 1;2 feet; thence East 10 feet
to the pla.ce of beginning, to· be kept open for
loading and unloading goods, merdhandise and
other commodities from the platform 1along the.
South line of Lot 3, B1oek and Plat aforesaid,
above referred t·o, together with the right of maintaining a. cover or roof over said platform at the
North end of said Right .o.f Way." (Exhiibit "X",
No. 25);
and a certain other deed of the ·same date from defendants, Seymour N. Bailey and wife to Bert N, Bailey,
covering said defendants' undivided one-half interest in
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what is now plaintiff's property, and reserving said easements and rights of way to and for the use of ·said Lot
2, in this language :
''Reserving, however, to the gl'lantors the perpetual Right to ·the maintenance and use nf the
platform now located on t•he Southern portion ~of
said premises about 10 feet wide including the
overlapping roof for said platform including also
the curve there,of along the railWJay spur as at
present •Constructed, with full right to repair, reconstruct or rebuild the same within its present
lo-catioJt.
'' A1.so reserving the perpetual Right to the
use ·of the trackage over and along the South line
·Of said premises and to the premises wnd to the
team, tra:ck or auto drive along the said track, all
to be used in corvnection arnd for the convenience
of Lot 2, of said Block for the loading and wn.loading of mercha;ndise.
''It is also hereby agreed that without the
oonsent of grantor, Seymour N. Bailey, or his assignS, that no right shall he granted for tlhe use
of said railway spur beyond the East end of said
Lot 3." (Exhibit ''X", No. 23);
and the deed by which plaintiff acquired ·title to his s1a.id
land from the Bailey brothers' succe.ssor in interest thereto, •On~ Walter H. Dayton, dated Augttst 2'8, 1928, contained a reference to defendants' ·said easements and
other rights, in this language:
''Subject to loading and trackage easements
~tc.'' (Exhibit "X", No. 51).
'
The material facts in the ease are not in dispute and
may be summarized as follows :
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1. In 1905 and 1906, the defendant, Seymour N.
Bailey, and his brother, Bert N. Bailey (now deceased)
acquired~ as tenants in c01nnwn, the South lf2 of Lot 3,
Bl1ock 43, being- the property now owned by plaintiff (Exhibit "X'', Nns. 5-8), and about the same time the two
brothers also acquired some property in Lot 2 of the
san1e block, and immediately adjoining said property on
the south, and from time to time thereafter, the two
brothers also acquired other property in .said Lot 2,
until eYentually and by the year 19·15, they had acquired
and owned all of the property here involved, both plaintiff's and all of defendants, except the easterly piece of
what is now the John Scowcroft & Sons •Company property, which was previously owned by and known as the
Fratello p:r.operty (Ex. "X", N·os. 8-20), and whieh is
not involved upon 'tihis appe~l.
2. In 1907, and while so owning plaintiff's property
and the property which they had a:cquired in said Lot 2,
adjoining plaintiff's property on the South, the two Bailey
br.others constructed, or caused to be constructed, a railroad spur i:rock upon .and across what is now plaintiff's
property, and at or about the same time, or shortly thereafter erected a warehouse building· on their property in
1Jhe northwest corner .of said Lot 2 ( Cudahy-N orth·western Hide Company building), and certain loading pl:a tforms on the southern portion of plaintiff's land adjacent to the north side of this building-, and along the
s~outh

side of the spur track, to serve their warehouse

building .so constructed.

Fron1 time to time thereafter,
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the Bailey brothers erected other WJarehouse buildings
on the property tJhey .a,cquired in said Lot 2, and constructed other and additional loading plat£orms and ·Other
facilities on what is now plaintiff's property, to serve
sueh warehouse buildings, including 1a concrete team,
truck and auto drive to the north of the spur track to
facilitate the movement of wagons, and later trueks, in
loading on the north side of the spur to and from box cars
thereon, and also to and from the loading platforms adjoining the spur .on tJhe south ·side thereof; and a hay
barn, stable and other buildings were also constructed on
what is now plaintiff'.s land, to the north of this concrete
team, truck and ,auto drive, and at the east end thereof
a warehouse building, now known as the Globe Mills
building, was constructed.
In ·connection with tihe ·eonstruction of the buildings
facing on 5tJh South Street (Summerhays and Seymour
N. Bailey buildings), whieh were eonstructed some time
after the Northwestern Hide-Cudahy building, there was
constructed, at the east end of the Northwestern Hide
building, a passage or runway about 10 feet wide running
from the loading platforms and spur track in a southerly
direction into and to serve these buildings, whieh had
no direct access to the loading platforms, tlhe ·spur track
and other facilities so eonstructed on what is now plaintiff's property, and these buildings ever since have been
and still are served by these loading platforms, spur
traek, team, track and auto drive and .other faeilities on
plaintiff's property through the said runway. The locaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion of the various properties involved and the buildings
and facilities erected and constructed thereon may he
readily under·stood by referring to Exhibit 7 and the
photographs, Exhibits 1 to 6, inclusive.
3. From the time of the eonstrnetion of these various buildings and facilities, the entire South lf2 of Lot 3
(plaintiff'.s property) was used for the benefit of arnd to
serve the Bailey ibrothers' pr.operty in Lot 2, and the
warehouse buildings constructed thereon-the facilitie,s
on said South 1f2 of Lot 3 (plaintiff's property) having
been constructed and designed to serve the then owners'
property in Lot 2. Tlhroughout the years down to the
present time, merchandise ·has been loaded to and from
railroad cars on the spur track to and from the loading
platform to the south thereof and over said platform
to and from the warehouses abutting the same on the
south, and likewise merchandise has been and still is
being loaded to and from wagons and trucks to the north
,of tJhe spur track to and from ·s1aid loading platform,
and over the same to and from said warehouses, and a
like use has been and still is being made of the loading
platforms at the west edge thereof where the concrete
platform and ramp is now located, and virtually the
whole of said South 1f2 ,of Lot 3 (plaintiff's property) to
the west of the Globe Mills building has throughout tihe
years and down to and including the present time been
used and is being used to drive w1agons and trucks over
a1nd upon, to ;serve the warehouses

~on

Lot 2, through and

over said loading platform as it was acquired and deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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signed by the Bailey brothers to do (Ab. 90, 94, 96, 109110).
4. In the year 1923, and while their properties were
being so used, the Bailey brothers commenced severing
their ownership of the several pr,operties, and at that
time Bert N. Bailey .sold ·and 'conveyed to his brother,
defendant, Seymour N. Bailey, his ·one-half interest in
what is now the Summerhays ibuilding or property (subject to certain indebtedness) in exchange for defendant,
Seymour Bailey's one-half interest in the Bouth lf2 of Lot
3 (plaintiff's property)-tJhe ,Summer hays property (with
other ·property) at the direction of Seymour Bailey, being
·conveyed by himself and his wife, and his said brother,
Bert N. Bailey and his wife, to the Bailey Company, deendant, Bailey & >Sons Company, ,and whi~h ·said deed is
the ,o,ne dated August 9, 19•23, mentioned and referred to
at the beginning of this Statement of Facts, and grants
and conveys the easements, rights of way and the right
to maintain an.d use, rebuild and repair the facilities on
the South 1/2 of Lot 3 (plaintiff's property) in the language hereinbefore set out; and in the deed to Bert N.
Bailey of defendant, Seymour N. Bailey's, ,one-half in~
terest in the South lf2 of Lot 3 (plaintiff's property), so
given in exchange for the above mentioned deed to Bailey
& Sons Company, and which is tlhe second deed at the
commencement ,of this Statement of Facts mentioned and
referred to, the·se ea-sements, rights and privilege.s were
reserved to and for the use of Lot 2, in the language
secondly hereinbefore ·set out.
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5. Later, Seymour N. Bailey's one-half interest in
the N orwestern Hide Company property (old Cudahy
building) was conveyed to the present owner, Colorado
Animal By-Products Company, with Bert N. Bailey, or
his estate, retaining and continuing to own his one-half
interest therein (now owned by Bert Bailey's son, defendant Robert Bailey Whitehill), and the old Scowcroft
building property was sold to the present owner, Scowcroft Company, with the deeds of c·onveyance in each
instance granting and conveying the same easements,
rights of way and privileges that had been granted and
reserved in the above mentioned deeds between Bert and
Seymour Bailey (Exhibit "X", No. 88). At the time
of all of these conveyances and down to the time of his
death, Bert N. Bailey (one of plaintiff's predece·ssors
in interest) himself owned property in Lot 2, which was
served by the south 1f2 of Lot 3 (plaintiff's property),
and the facilities thereon-the property so owned by
Bert Bailey in 1923, when and after he became the sole·
owner of said South :Y2 ·of Lot 3 (plaintiff's property)
under the deeds of conveyance between the Bailey brothers above referred to, consisting of an undivided one-half
interest in the old Scowcroft building property and a
like interest in the Seymour N. Bailey building and the
Northwestern Hide & Fur Company building, which two
last mentioned properties he continued to own to the
time of his death, and the same is now, as above noted,
owned by his heir and son, the defendant, Robert Bailey
Whitehill.
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6. In August 1928 when plaintiff acquired title to
the South :y2 of Lot 3, as a mesne successor in interest
of Bert N. Bailey and his brother, the defendant, Seymour N. Bailey, the easements, rights of way, loading
platforms and other facilities above mentioned were
open, visible and apparent thereon, and in open and continuous use by the defendants or their predecess·ors in
interest just as they had been for more than twenty
years, and the deeds above mentioned, wiherein the easements, rights and privileges were granted and reserved,
were properly of record in the office of the County
Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, and the deed of
the .property to plaintiff expressly referred to these
easements and rights of way, and made· the conveyance
subject thereto in the language thirdly set out at the
beginning of this Statement of Facts.
7. About May or June of 1932, the defendants, or
some ·of them, replaced a portion of the old lumber loading platform on the south line of plaintiff's property
and adjoining the Northwestern Hide & Fur Company
building, with a concrete loading platform or ramp, and
paved with ·concrete the area from the foot of this ramp
to the west line of plaintiff's property, and also an area
of some 6 or 7 feet in width between such west line and
the city sidewalk.
8.

Prior to the construction of this concrete ramp,

the area s·outh of the spur track was not surfaced in any
way, and in wet weather the ground became muddy and
soggy, resulting in a virtual mud hole, making it exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tremely difficult to drive trucks and wagons over it in
approaching and backing up to the loading platforms,
and necessitating frequent dumping of cinders in the
area to fill up the mud holes and make it passable (Ab.
99, 1~1). S01ne idea of the condition of this area prior
to the laying of the .concrete may be gained from an
inspection of the photograph, Exhibit 1, showing an
area in the region of the city sidewalk and west thereof
where the unsurfaced ground has been cut up by trucks
and wagons, and even in dry weather still has a small
pool of water standing on the ground.
As previously noted, all of the foregoing facts are
either admitted by the pleadings or stand uncontroverted
in the record, and the only dispute in the testimony relates to the width at its western extremity ,o.f the portion
of the old wooden platform that was replaced by the
present concrete platform and ramp, and as to whether,
in laying such concrete, the defendants covered more
area than was covered by the portion of the old wooden
platforn1 so replaced by such concrete, but as the trial
court's findings and decree, in excluding defendants from
all of plaintiff's property north of the spur track, as
well as some south thereof, is against law under and
does violence to the admitted facts in the case, from
which it appears that by the reservations and grants
above set out, as well as the use made of plaintiff's
property for more than thirty years, and the interpretation thereby placed upon such grants and reservations,
defendants have, and are, as a matter of law, entitled
t·o easements and rights of way over portions of plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tiff's land from which they are excluded by the decree;
and as they had, as a matter of law, the right to surface
the area over which they had such rights of way, including that south of the railroad spur, and to rebuild their
loading platforms thereon, the above mentioned dispute
in the testimony is of little, if any, importance upon this
appeal, and will be considered only in relation to plaintiff's claim that the burden upon his property has been
unreasonably increased by the surfacing of the portion
now covered by the concrete.
Upon the facts above detailed, the trial court ordered
"that plaintiff have judgment against the defendants in
accordance with the prayer of the complaint" (Ab. 139),
which, as previously noted, prayed that plaintiff's title
be quieted against all claims of defendants, and that
defendants be restrained from using plaintiff's land,
or any part thereof, for any purpose whatsoever (Ab.
4); but not even counsel for plaintiff had the temerity
to pr,opose such a decree in view of the evidence in the
case, and a decree of counsel's making was, therefore,
entered, which is contrary to the record and the evidence,
and in violation and disregard of the express terms of
the grants and reservations above set out, excludes defendants from the use of the team track or auto drive
and property to the north of the spur track, and limits
defendants' rights in plaintiff's property to the maintenance of a platform over a small portion of the property to the g,outh of the spur track, to review which
judgment or decree, and the actions of the trial court
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leading- up to the entry thereof, this appeal has been
perfected.
~TATE:JlEXT

OF ERRORS, QUESTIONS FOR
DETERMIXATIOX AND BRIEF OF
THE .A.RGU:JIENT.

~\s

previously pointed out, plaintiff brought his
action to quiet title to his land, alleging that defendants
had no interest in or easements over ·or upon the same,
or any part thereof. In reply to defendants' answers,
setting up their easements and rights of way and other
rights and privileges over and in and concerning his
property, plaintiff admitted the terms of the grants and
reservations creating such easements and rights, and
that defendants had the easements and rights alleged
by them, but charged that defendants had exceeded their
rights in paving some of the area in question and covering with a concrete platform and ramp more area than
had been covered by the portion of the wooden platform
which the same replaced ; and the case was there by attempted to be converted from a suit to quiet title into
one to determine the extent of easements and rights
admittedly possessed by defendants, contrary to the
alleg-ations of the complaint; and the case was thus tried
and required to be tried upon issues framed by defendantf'' answers and plaintiff's replies, and the allegations
thereof, and not in anywise by plaintiff's complaint.
Because of this exceedingly unusual procedure and
because the trial court, in undertaking to decide upon
the issues so framed, in his findings ·of Fact, Conclu-
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sions and Decree entirely departed from and found contrary to the admitted facts in the case, even to the extent
of striking certain language from the reservations contained in one of the deeds in que-stion (Ex. "X", No. 23)
when incorporating such language in his Findings of
Fact (F. of F. 2, Ab. 14-omits the words "and to the
premises'' after the word "premises" in line 3 thereof),
and incorporating in his Findings and Decree metes and
bounds figures and dimensions of which there is absolutely no evidence in the record, as well as in other
respects, the defendants have necessarily assigned quite
a large number ·of errors, many of which while addressed
to separate findings of fact or conclusions of law or to
the decree itself, relate to and cover the same general
proposition or propositions, and theref·ore can well and
will he grouped together for consideration herein under
the following heads or propositions comprising our
Statement of Errors relied upon, Questions for Determination and Brief of the Argument:
A. The Court erred in denying defendant's
motion for a judgment on plaintiff's eo·mplaint.
PoiNT

POINT B.
The Court erred in its findings, conclusions and decree in excluding defendants from use of the
team track or auto drive and property north of the
spur track, and in limiting defendants' use of and ease-

ments over plaintiff's property to a portion only of the
property south of the spur track, and the maintenance
of a small platform thereon; and the findings of fact,
conclusions of law and decree, in so excluding defendants
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and limiting their use of plaintiff's property, are each
contrary to and not supported by the evidence and are
each against law. (Ass. of Error Nos. 2 to 10, both incl.).
PoiNT C. The Court erred in its findings, conclusions and decree in ordering and requiring removal of
the present concrete loading platform and ramp, and in
limiting the platform which may be maintained by
defendants t·o a platform of the dimensions set forth in
the findings and decree herein; and the findings of fact,
conclusions of law and decree, in so requiring and limiting defendants, and in so specifying the size of such
platform, are contrary to and not supported by the
evidence and are against law. (Ass. of Error, Nos. 4, 5,
6, 7, Abs. 185, 186, 187).
PorNT D. The Court erred in disregarding and
failing to rule upon and in signing the findings of fact
and conclusions of law without ruling upon, and without
affording defendants an opportu~ity to be heard upon
their objections and .proposed amendments to the findings ·of fact, conclusions of law and decree as proposed
by plaintiff, and thereafter signed by the court. (Ab.
161-69; Ass. of Error 31).
PoiNT E. The Court erred in admitting in evidence,
over defendants' objection, and in overruling defendants' objections to each of plaintiff's Exhibits "L",
"M'' "N" "0" "P" "Q'' and ''R'' and in using

'

'

'

'

'

'

and considering said exhibits as evidence in the case and
basing the findings and decree herein in part upon the
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ing in the findings, conclusions and decree herein descriptions (by metes and bounds) of portions of plaintiff's property of which there is no evidence in the case,
and which were apparently supplied de hors the record.
(Ass. of Error Nos. 20 to 30, both incl.).
F. The Court ',s decree is erroneous, contrary to law and not supported by the evidence or the
findings of fact, and should be reversed (Ass. of Error
Nos. 11 to 17, both incl.).
POINT

Before proceeding to a discussion of our several
propositions, it may be helpful to the Court to briefly
point out and state our complaints of the Court's several findings and conclusions concerning which error
is assigned, and such complaints may be summarized
as follows:
1. Finding of Fact No. 3 is not supported by the
evidence, but is contrary thereto.

2. Finding of Fact No. 11 is contrary to the evidence and false to the record in that there has been
omitted from the recital of the reservation in the deed
therein referred to, the words ''and to the premises''
which follow the word ''premises'' in the third line of
the second paragraph of such reservation, and by such
omission, the Court has attempted to relieve plaintiff's
property of a portion of the burden imposed thereon by
such reservation, in violation and disregard of the
express terms thereof (see Entry 23 of Abst., Ex. X).
3. Finding of Fact No. 12 is contrary to the evidence in that it ·omits from the grant in the deed therein
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referred to certain terms thereof specifying the purpose
of the grant. (See .Ass. of Error No. 33; Ex. X, No. 26).
4. Finding of Fact No. 13 is contrary to and not
supported by the evidence in that there is no evidence
that at the time found, or at any ·other time, there was
a platform of the dimensions therein recited, or that
the roof therein referred to was of the dimensions therein found and recited, and the said dimensions and metes
and bounds description in said Finding contained were
apparently supplied de hors the reeord.
5. Finding of Fact No. 14 is not supported by the
evidence in that there is no evidence whatsoever that
defendants claim the right to exclude plaintiff from
the use of that portion of his property covered by said
concrete ramp, or that the oonstruction, maintenance or
use of said ramp has increased the burden upon plaintiff's property, or that the same is wrongful or damaging to plaintiff or his property beyond what follows
and is contemplated by the rights granted and reserved
in and concerning said property f,or the benefit of defendants' property.
6.

Findings of Fact Nos. 15 and 16 are each con-

trary to and not supported by the evidence in that there
is no evidence that defendants' right to maintain a loading platform or a roof over the same upon plaintiff's
property is limited to a platform or a roof of the dimensions in said findings set forth, and the dimensions therein set forth were apparently supplied de hors the reeord.
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7. Finding of Fact No. 18 is contrary to and not
supported by the ·evidence, false to the record and at
variance and in conflict with Finding of Fact No. 12
and the grants and reservations of defendants' easeInents over and rights in plaintiff's property therein and
in the deeds, and in Findings ·of Fact Nos. 11 and 12,
contained, in that by said grants and reservations there
was granted and reserved for the benefit of defendants'
property a perpetual right to ''the use of the railroad
spur, together with the team, truck and auto drive along
the north line thereof,'' (Ab. 148, last paragraph of
reservation), and there was also reserved a perpetual
right to the use ·of the trackage and ''to the premises''
(referring to plaintiff's land), notwithstanding which,
and contrary thereto, the Court finds and adjudges, in
and by said finding, that defendants have no easements
over or rights in any of plaintiff's property north of
the spur track, or except to maintain a platform over a
small portion of tJhe ground south of the spur track.
8. The conclusions of law and decree are false to
the record, and neither find support in the evidence or
in the findings, in that they likewise exclude defendants
from use of the team track or auto drive and property
north of the spur track, and limit defendants' rights in
plaintiff's property to a small area south ·of the spur
track, and the maintenance of a small loading platform
over the same, contrary to and in disregard of the express terms of the grants and reservations which are in
part set out and in part falsely omitted from the Findings of Fact; and the Decree, in ordering and requiring
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the removal of the concrete loading platfor1n and ramp
presently upon plaintiff's property, is against law and
finds no support either in the evidence or the findings of
fact.
Coming now to a consideration of our several propositions aboYe enumerated.
POINT A.
As previously pointed out, plaintiff in
his complaint alleged that he and his predecessors in
interest haYe been in open, notorious, continuous and
adverse possession of the real estate therein described
for more than seven years with hostility toward the
claims of all other persons, and that plaintiff's possession has been exclusive except for wrongful trespasses and encroachments hy defendants, and he further
alleged that defendants claim the right to use a portion
of his real estate for roadway purposes and loading
and unloading of merchandise from and upon railroad
cars and trucks which pass over and upon plaintiff's
land, and to maintain and use a ramp and loading
platform thereon, and that they are making constant
use of the same, and that such use is wrongful and in
violation of the rights of the plaintiff, and he prayed
that his title be quieted against all such claims of defendants, and that they be restrained and enj,oined from
using his property, or any portion thereof, for any
purpose whatsoever. In his reply, however, plaintiff
said that the allegations of his complaint above referred
to were false and untrue in that he admitted that defendants had and were entitled to certain easements and
rights of way over and ,other rights in and concerning
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his property, and he specifically admitted that in and
by the deeds alleged in defendants' answers, by and
between the common grantors of the parties, grants or
reservations of easements and rights in his property
were contained, as alleged by defendants.
Ignoring the bad faith evident in this type of pleading, the effect thereof was to convert the action from one
to quiet plaintiff's title against allegedly unfounded
claims of defendants, into an action to construe the
grants and reservations contained in the Bailey brothers
deeds, and to determine the extent of defendants' admitted easements over and rights in plaintiff's property,
which plaintiff claimed and asserted were not as great
or extensive as asserted by defendants. Plaintiff's complaint thus went entirely out of the lawsuit, and the
ease was presented for trial upon the allegations of defendants' answers and the plaintiff's replies thereto.
This Court has several times held, as have the
courts generally, that the character of a lawsuit may
not be thus changed or a new and different cause of
action and prayer or claim for relief thus introduced into
the 0a.se. Combined Metals v. Bastia~Jz, 71 Utah 535;
Idaho Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Robinson, 54 Utah 481;
Straw v. Temple, 48 Utah 258; Fields v. Cobbey, 22
Utah 415; .Weber v. Wannamaker, (Colo.) 89 Pac. 780~
Clernmons v. McGreer, (vVash.) 115 Pac. 1081.
Ordinarily, a suit to quiet title or to remove a cloud
on title may not be employed to obtain the Court's construction of a deed or other instrument under which the
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parties claim. Trustees of School v. lVilson, (Ill.) 166
X. E. 33, IS A. L. R. ~2, and note 78 A. L. R. 44.
In his eon1plaint, plaintiff asserted that defendants
had no interest in or easement over his land, and prayed
that the eourt so adjudge, and by its decree enjoin
defendants from ''taking possession of or using all or
any port ton of plaintiff's real estate for any purpose
whatsoeYer. '' By his replies, plaintiff admitted and
alleged that defendants did have some rights in and easements oYer his land, and that he, therefore, was not
entitled to the relief prayed in his complaint. There
was not even any prayer, either in the con1plaint or in
plaintiff's replies, which authorized the proceedings had
or the judgment or decree entered in the case, but the
Court, nevertheless, and notwithstanding defendants'
motion, proceeded to hear and determine, not the case
made by plaintiff's complaint, but a case purporting
to be n1ade by defendants' answers and plaintiff's replies
thereto which "·as and is an entirely different case from
that attempted to be made by the complaint. It is submitted that defendants' motion was well taken and that
the Court erred in denying the same and refusing to
dismiss plaintiff's complaint, and in proceeding to hear
the ease so purporting to have been made upon defendants' answers and plaintiff's replies thereto.
POINT

B.

As previously pointed out, all parties to

this action, so far as the property involved on this
appeal is concerned, claim through the same or common
owners and grantors, namely, defendants Seymour N.
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Bailey and his deceased brother, Bert N. Bailey, who
were the owners as tenants in common of plaintiff's land
as well as that of all of the appealing defendants. Such
joint ownership .of plaintiff's land, as well as the major
part of the lands in Lot 2 here involved, was severed in
1923, by the conveyance to Bert of defendants, Seymour
Bailey's, one-half interest in what is now plaintiff's
property, and the conveyance to the defendant, Bailey
& Sons Company, by Bert and Seymour Bailey and their
wives of said defendants' lands in Lot 2, by the deeds of
conveyance dated August 9, 1923, which are found and
described in Findings of Fact Nos. 11 and 12, and the
rights in and easements over what is now plaintiff's
land were therein granted and reserved; and as all of
the parties claim under and through these deeds it is
obvious that they are bound and their rights are determined by the de-eds, and the grants and reservations
therein contained, and they can neither detract from nor
add to the rights therein granted and reserved.
Aside from the rights granted and reserved to maintain loading platforms and a roof over the same, and to
rebuild and reconstruct such platforms, which we will.
consider under Point C, the deeds above referred to
(Finding No. 11) reserve ''the perpetual right to the
use of the trackage aJong the s·outh line of said premises
a;nd to the premises, and to the team, truck or auto drive
along the said track, all to be used in connection and for
the convenience of Lot 2 of ·said block for the loading and
unloading of merchandise" (Entry No. 23, Ex. X). It
will be observed that the words "and to the premises"
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are omitted froin the Finding as copied in the abstract
of the record for the reason that said words were stricken from the reservation as set forth in said Finding.
If the Court will look at Finding No. 11 of the original
Findings, however, (Tr. 120) it will be observed that
said words were properly inserted and then stricken with
pen and ink.
The above quoted reservation plainly and in unmistakable terms reserves, in addition to the trackage, the
right to the use of the premises, which plainly means the
premises being granted, namely, the South half of Lot
3 (plaintiff's property); and it also specifically reserves
the right to the use of the team, truck or auto drive
along the spur track, and all this ''to be used in connection and for the convenience of Lot 2 etc.''
The deed from the Bailey brothers and their wives
to Bailey & Sons Company ('F. of F. No. 12) also contains an express, grant of ''the perpetual right to the
use of the railroad spur, together with the team, truck
and auto drive along the north line thereof etc.,'' and
hence, there is by these deeds unmistakably and plainly
reserved and granted a perpetual right to the use of
plaintiff's premises· north as well as south of the railroad spur track, including and specially referred to and
granted, the team, truck or auto drive along the north
line of the spur track.

In this connection, it might be

noted that this team or auto drive was constructed on
the north side of the spur track and paved with concrete
prior to 1914, and it has existed and been used ever
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since down to and including the present, for the loading
and unloading of merchandise on the north side of the
spur track to and from box cars thereon, and also to and
from the loading platforms on the south side of the
spur (Ah. 90, 95). The pavement is now pretty well
worn and covered with gravel, but may still plainly be
seen on the ground, and it plainly a ppean:; in the
photograph, Exhibit 4.
Notwithstanding these express and plain grants
and reservations, the trial court, by its Findings and
De-cree appealed fron1, excludes defendants from and
finds and adjudges that defendants have no easements
or rights of way over any part of plaintiff's property
~1Jorth of the spur track.
The language in these grants and reservations is
plain and unan1biguous, and neither requires nor is subject to any construction, but if they are to be in anywise
construed, it devolves upon the Court to look to the situation of the parties, the object to he attained and the
circumstances generally surrounding and attending the
transaction when the instruments granting and reserving
the easements and rights of way were made.
As ·said by this Court in Stevens v. Bird-Jex Co.,
81 Utah 355, quoting with approval from other cases
(page 360):
"in construing instruments creating easements
in land, the court will look to the circumstances
attending the transaction, the situation of the
parties, the state of the thing gran ted, and the
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object to be attained, to ascertain and give effect
to the intention of the parties.''
It should also be ren1embered that the easements
here in question are '·easements appurtenant' '-they
are attached to and for the benefit ,of the lands in Lot 2,
in which both grantors in such deeds had, and continued
to have, property to which such easements and rights
were necessary and convenient; Ernst v. Allen, et al.;
Allen et al. v. Langford, 55 Utah 272; and this being an
equitable action, it i:S not only the right but the duty
of this Court to review, weigh and consider the evidence
and determine questions of fact as well as of law. Jensen
v. Birch Creek Ranch Co., 76 Utah 356-362; Leland
v. Bourne, 41 Utah 125, 137.
\\Then the grants and reservations in the deeds, and
the admitted facts and uncontroverted evidence in the
case, are looked to with the above stated cardinal rule
of construction in mind, it is too plain to admit of dispute
that such grants and reservations created, granted and
reserved easements and rights of way ·over plaintiff's
land to the north as well as to the south of the railroad
spur track-it was plainly contemplated by the Bailey
brothers when they made these deeds, and the grants
and reservations therein, that plaintiff's property even
to the whole thereof west of the Globe Mills Building, if
required, should be used as a driveway and turn-ar·ound
''for the convenience of Lot 2 of said Block, for the
loading and unloading of merchandise,'' as specifically
stated in the deeds.
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As previously noted, plaintiff's property had been
so used for more than thirty years by the ·owners of
the several properties in Lot 2. To facilitate this use,
a paved driveway (team, truck or auto drive) was constructed on the north side of the spur track, and all of
the area in front of the Globe Mills Building was paved
as a turn-around f.or wagons and trucks, and it has
been through tJhe years, and still is, ·so used. (See map,
Ex. 7, and testimony of Ryser, Richards and Jensen,
.Ab. 90, 95, 105, 109, 110, 120-122). Plaintiff's own witnesses, Evans and Snow, employees of Kelly-Springfield
Tire Co., which occupied the Northwestern Hide & Fur
Co. Building from about 1926 to 1931, testified to a
similar use ·of the .property by that company and others
dealing with it (Ab. 128-130, 134).
This use of the property, and the easements and
rights of way, were open, visible and apparent, and in
constant use at the time plaintiff bought his property.
He so admits in his reply (Ab. 56-75), and he further
admitted on the witness stand that he had inspected the
property before he bought it. (Ab. 86). In view thereof,
plaintiff was charged with notice and knowledge of these
easements and the extent thereof, and the extent of
defendants' claims thereunder and the full use of the
property which was being made at the time he purchased
the same. R.ollo v. Nelson, 34 Utah 116.
It is also significant that for more than ten years

after he acquired the property, plaintiff stood by and
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ments, and the extent of defendants' claim.s thereunder,
without protest ·or complaint of any kind, and he and
his property are, therefore, not only bound by the easements and right of way as expressed in the language
in which the same are granted and reserved in the deeds
in question, but also with the construction which had
been placed upon the same by the use made and being
made of the property both before and after he acquired
it. Rollo t\ }.;r elson, supra.
Contrary to the admitted facts and the express
terms of the grants and reservations in the deeds, as
well as the construction which had been placed upon the
same by many years of use of the property, the trial
court found that defendants had no easements or rights
of \Yay over or other rights in the team, truck or auto
drive, and property north of the spur track, and by the
decree appealed from excluded defendants from all of
such property. Thus, and contrary to the uncontroverted
facts and evidence in the case, the Court found in Finding Xo. 3 that plaintiff and his predecessors in interest
have been in exclusive and adverse possession of his
real estate for more than seven years, except for wrongful encroachments by defendants, and the Court also,
in Finding No. 18 found that defendants have no easement or right of way except as found in certain ·of the
other findings which relate to the property south of
the spur track, and found that defendants have merely
a right to maintain a sn1allloading platform on a portion

nf said property.

Such Findings and Decree, we sub-
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mit, are plainly C·ontrary to the evidence and against
law and ought not to be permitted to stand.
PorNT C.

\Yith respect to that portion of plaintiff's
property south of the spur track, which is now paved
with concrete and contains the concrete platforn1 and
ran1p complained ·of, the evidence is likewise undisputed
that under the grants and reservations in the deeds,
as \Yell as by continued use, and the construction thereby
placed upon such grants and reservations, defendants
have and are entitled to easements and rights of way
over the whole of such property so south of the spur
track. The trial court in its Findings and Decree recognized and decreed such right over a portion of such
land in connection with his decree of the right of defendants to maintain a platfor1n over a portion of said
ground (Ab. 149-53). The evidence shows that for more
than thirty years, tean1s, and later trucks, have been
driven over this area and backed up from the west to
and against the westerly edge ·of the loading platform
·which existed at the rear of the Northwestern Hide &
Fur Company building before the present ramp and
platform was constructed, as well as from the north to
and against the northerly edge thereof, using and traYersing every inch of the ground no\v covered by such
concrete platforn1 and ramp, ·of which plaintiff complains ; and this ground is being used today in just the
~ame manner as it has been used throughout the years,
except that instead of backing up over a piece of flat
unsurfaced terrain which was a virtual 1nud hole in wet
weather, to a perpendicular edge of a loading platform,
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the tnwks now back over concrete and up a slight incline
cr grade to the loading· platfonn itself, which is now
somewhat lower than the portion thereof which was
removed when the concrete was laid, and this concrete
ramp and platform cover the identical land which was
so used and traversed by teams, wagons and trucks in
backing up to the old wooden platform which it replaced.
The witnesses, Ryser, Richards and Jensen, each testified to this use for twenty-five years or more (Ah.
94-110-120-22), and the plaintiff's own witnesses, Evans
and Snow, confirmed this use of the property from
about 19:26 to 19131 (Ab. 130-34), and there is no testimony whatever to the contrary, and as previously noted,
the trial court in its Findings and Decree has so found
and recognized su{'h easmnents and rights of way in part.
By the terms of the grants and reservations, the
owners of the lands in Lot 2, admittedly have the right
to maintain a loading platform or platform·s on the .goutih'"
ern portion ;Of p1aintiff's property, with the "full right
to repair, reconstruct or rebuild the ·Same within its present location." (Ex. X, :23 and 25, F. of F. Nos. 11 and
12).
There is some dispute in the testimony concerning
the .size of the portion of the old platform which was
replaced h,v the concrete, but irrespective of such disl'Pte in the testimony, and irrespective and regardless
of the size ·of such platform, which we will !hereinafter
consider, the defendants under said grants and reservations unquestionably have the right to maintain, and they
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had the right to build or construct a platform on this
portion of plaintiff's property of some dimensions;
and further and more important upon this appeal, the
defendants have and are entitled to easements and rights
of way over plaintiff's ground, and the whole thereof
south of the spur track, to reach and drive wagons and
other 'conveyances over and upon in re,aching and backing up to any such loading platform. What defendants
did in tearing down a portion of the old platform and
replacing the same with concrete had to do more with
their easements and rights of way over the ground, than
it did with the rebuilding or reconstructing of the portion ·of the platform so removed. What defendants
actually did was to remove a portion of the old wooden
platform and surface with concrete the area over which
they so had their easements and rights of way, including
the area previously covered by such old platf.orm,
slightly changing the grade of a portion of their rights
of way .so that the right of way, in addition to being
surfaced with concrete now slopes up ramplike to the
remaining portion of the old platform, but as previously
noted, the cement and ramp covers the identical area
over which defendants have such easements, and over
which teams and trucks would have to back to reach any
loading platform upon this portion of plaintiff's property, whether constructed as such platform was originally or as the same is now. In other words, defendants,
in laying such concrete, merely surfaced their right of
way and slightly changed the grade thereof so as to
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make their easements and rights of way serviceable and
more convenient for their use in the manner intended.
Having the easements and rights of way over and
up·on the ground now covered by the concrete and ramp,
defendants had, as a matter of law, the rigiht to surface
their easements and rights of way to make the same
passable and more convenient for their use, including
the right to change the grade of such easements or rights
of "\Yay so long as in doing so they did not unreasonably
interfere with s·ome use plaintiff was entitled to make
of this portion of his property, i. e., so long as they did
not increase the burden or servitude upon plaintiff's
land.
The rule respecting the right of the owner of an
easement or right of way to maintain, repair, surface
and otherwise change and impr·ove the same is well
stated in American Jurisprudence, Vol. 17, page 1005,
Sec. 111, in this language :
''Generally, the grantor ·Of an easement consisting of a way in the absence of any express
stipulation is under no obligation to maintain the
way in a condition .suitable for use; maintenance
of the way is left to the grantee. The latter may
make the way as useable as possible for the purpose of the right ·owned so long as he does not
increas-e the burden on the servient tenement or
unreasonably interfere with the rights of the
owner thereof. The right of the owner of an
easement of way to make repairs exists without
question where the way is impassable and useless
without repairs. It has been held that the grantee
of an easement may prepare the way f.or proper
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use and, hence, may grade, gravel, plough or
pave su.ch way. I-Ie may depress the grad~ of. the
way so as to make it accessible to a pubhc hi~h
way with which it connects. There IS authonty
for the proposition tha~ the owner of a;n ease~ent
of way may improve It by constructing a sidewalk but he can do nothing in any respect which
tend~ to place an additional burden upon the
servient premises or interferes with the rights of
other persons having a right to use the way. The
reasonableness of the improvements or repairs
made by the owner of an easement of way is
largely a question of fact.''
Section 112, page 1006:
''The test to determine the right to n1ake a
particular alteration is whether the alteration is
so substantial as to result in the creation and
substitution of a different servitude from that
which previously existed.''
In Doan v. Allgood, (Ill. 1923) 141 N. E. 779, the
Court laid down the rule in this language :
"Whoever has an easement in or over the
land ·Of another has the right to do everything
necessary to preserve the easement, and the right
to repair a way is fully established. * * * The
question of what acts of repair are reasonable in
the use and enjoyment of an easement is one of
fact in each particular case, and depends on the
extent and character of the lawful use of the
easement. The owner of the easement may make
such grades or fills and lay such tiles or construct
such ditches as may be necessary to enable him
to make use of the way in accordance with the
grant, provided in so doing he does not injure
the servient estate. He may not construct a grade
or fill or ditch in such a manner as to affeet
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injuriously the adj·oining· land of the servient
estate.''
And in i.llissio11ary Soc. v. Evrotas, (N.Y.) 175 N. E.
3~~.

the rights of the owner of an easement or rights

of way are thus stated:
'' EYen if defendant's easement were to be
constructed as no broader than a right of passage,
he would be entitled to break up the soil, level
irregularities, fill up depressions, blast rocks, and
not only ren1ove impediments but supply deficiencies in order to construct a suitable road.
* * * In so far as such operations would not
interfere with the rights of the other abutting
owners, his actions would not proceed beyond the
intent of the grant. His right to use the land
f.or the passage of vehicles cannot be regarded
as free and unobstructed, if he be obliged to
refrain from putting it in a reasonably convenient
condition for such a use.''
To like effect, and establishing the right of an
owner of an easement or right of way to change the
grade of the way, pave or otherwise surface it, and
make and maintain the same in a condition for his convenient use, see Guillet v. Livernois, (Mass.) 8 K. E.
(2d) 921; Brown v. Stone, (Mass.) 10 Gray 61, 69 Am.
Dec. 303; Atkins v. Bordman, (Mass.) 2 Met. 457, 37
Am. Dec. 100; J( aatz v. Curtis, (Mass.) 102 N. E. 424;
Do an l\ Allgood, supra; Heuer v ..Webster, 187 Ill. App.
273; Hernt-an v. Roberts, (N.Y.) 23 N. E. 442, 7 L. R. A.
226, 16 Am. St. Rep. 801; Bina v. Bina, (Ia.) 239 N. W.
68, 78 A. L. R. 1216; Newcomen v. Coulson, (Eng.)
L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 133 C. A.; Central Christian Church v.
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Lennon, (Wash.) 109 Pac. 1027; Smith v. Rome, 19 Ga.
89, 63 Am. Dec. 298; and Freeman v. Sayre, 48 N. J. L.
37, 2 Atl. 650.
Under the authorities above cited, defendants had
the right to do exactly what they did respecting their
easements and rights of way, unless in so doing they
unreasonably interfered with some right ·of plaintiff, i.e.,
unless they increased the burden or servitude upon his
property, and the only question in this connection then
is as to whether in so cen1enting the ground over which
they had their easements and rights of way, defendants
did increase the burden or servitude upon plaintiff's
land.
By way of C·onclusion merely, the trial court finds
that the burden upon plaintiff's property was increased
(F. of F. 14), but no fact or facts whatever are found
supporting this ·Conclusion, and when the evidence is
looked to there is not a scintilla of evidence which could
be .claimed to even remotely support any such conclusion.
The onus was on plaintiff to prove his allegation of
increased burden (Bu.rns v. Williams, (Minn.) 172 N. W.
772), but he neither produced nor attempted to produce
any evidence whatsoever upon this point, and the evidence produced generally went to show 0onclusively that
there was no increase of the burden on plaintiff's property by such paving of this area, and the construction of
the ramp complained of. It was uncontroverted that in
wet weather the water drained into this area making it a
virtual mud hole, requiring frequent dumping ·of cinders
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therein in an atten1pt to fill up the holes (Ab. 121-22),
which of itself furnished good ground for paving the.
area and building the ramp to drain off the water and
keep the area dry and passable, thereby benefiting rather
than burdening the property. Guillet v. Livernois,
supra.
Plaintiff himself could of course do nothing .on this
property that would interfere with defendants' use thereof. In view of defendants' easements and rights of way,
he could not erect any building or obstruction of any
kind, not even so much as a peanut stand on any portion
of this ground, because to do so would interfere with
free access to the ground and the loading platforms
thereon, irrespective of whether such platforms were
of the size claimed by plaintiff, or of the size c1aimed
by defendants, or as now ·constructed in the form of platforms, ramp and paving. Plaintiff can now make every
use of his property, and every portion thereof, which he
rould make before the area in question was paved and
the present ramp constructed. He has not shown, and
he cannot show that he has in anywise been deprived
of any use of ·Or any right in his property which he is
entitled to, by the paving and construction of the ramp
complained of, and there is, therefore, no support whatsoever for the claim or the trial court's conclusion that
the burden upon plaintiff's property has been increased
by the paving thereof.
If, as we contend, defendants had the right to surface the ground ·covered by tJheir easements and rights of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

38

way• ' 1and in do in 0rr so they did not increase the burden
upon plaintiff's land, then the size of the old ,original
platform, or the portion thereof that was replaced by
the concrete, and whether the concrete covers more area
than was covered by :such platform, is immaterial to and
,of no consequence in this la·wsuit, and tlhe evidence and
testimony ·Concerning the size of such platform need not
be reonsidered, 1but as the trial court made findings upon
this question contrary to the evidence and admitted facts,
we shall1briefly refer to this matter and the evidence coneerning it.
Upon the trial, it 'Yas contended, and no doubt will
be in this Court, that the language in the reservation in
the deed referred to in Finding of Fa.ct No. 11, reserving
the rig1ht to maintain a platform on the southern portion
of plaintiff's property "abrout 10 feet wide", and the
reservation of the right to repair or rebuild such platform ''within its present loeation," fixed and determined
the size -of the platform which defendants could maintain
at about 10 feet in width, but while there is some slight
dispute in the evidence concerning the exact size of tihe
old pLatform at its westerly edge, the undisputed evidence and the physical fa,cts and circumstances do establish beyond the per adventure of a doubt that the platform referred to in the deeds, and as it originally existed,
never was of 1a width of only 10 feet, and that no n1atter
what its w1dth at its westerly edge (which is tlhe point
abrout which the testimony differed), the northerly edge
of the platform did follow the eurve of the spur, and did
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have a width of ~unw thirty to thirt:·-fin~ feet, and these
facts were establi:.-:hed by plaintiff's own witnesses, Sno·w
and E,·ans (Ab. 1:2~, 131, 133-4).
In 1addition to referring to the platform as ''about
10 feet wide,'' the reserva ti,on also includes the right to
maintain an oYerlapping roof for said platform, and further deseribes the platfonn as "including also the curve
thereof ~along the railroad spur.'' Althoug1h this language
follows the reference to the roof over the platform, it
obviously refers to the platform itself because the roof
never did follow the curve of the track, and is a.t present
in the same condition as when originally constructed,
that is, straight-edged and not curved (see photos, Ex.
2, 3 and 5), and in some of the conveyances the roof is
referred to as being at the north end of the platform,
which is in acoo~rdance with the facts (Ab. 33). From the
photographs received in evidence, and the plat, E·xhibit
7, the Court will note that the spur runs in a general east
and westerly direction, curving to the north as it approaches and enters the ·street, which furnishes the curve
referred to in the reservation, and it is, therefore, apparent from the language of the reservation and the
physical facts, t\ha.t the words ''about 10 feet wide,'' refer
to the easterly end of the platform and not the westerly
end thereof, as plaintiff apparently seeks to interpret it,
I

as otherwise the language following such dimensions,
''including also the curve thereof etc.,'' would be meaningless. In other Wiords, the language in the reservation
obviously specifies a platform proceeding from a width
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of "about 10 feet'' at its easterl/y extremity, and running
west with a .curve to the nor~h. along the ·spur track, which
very effectively describes a platform ·occupying the area
between the north wall of the warehouse buildings on
Lot 2, and the spur track, following with its northerly
edge the line of the spur as it curves to the north towards
and into the street, :and this is in accordance wi11h the evidence (Ab. 90, 91, 102-3, 106, 119, 123). It is obvious that
to be ,of any use as a loading platform to and from box
cars on the ,spur, the platform would have to follow the
curve of the ·spur and be constructed within a few feet
of the track .and this would be particularly true of the
portion of the plat£orm at and near the westerly end adjacent to the Northwestern Hide & Fur Company building, ·where the undisputed evidence shows that meat and
other commodities were loaded to .and from hox .cars on
the spur, and where a pair -of scales were set into the
platform at the time this building was occupied by
Cudahy, and large meat trucks were operated on the platform to lo.ad and unload meat and other commodities
from the box ·cars over the platform a~nd into the wareihouse building (Ah. 120, 123). Men who had worked over
this platform for more than twenty-five years testified
that it was 32 feet wide at its westerly extremity, with
a j·og to the east of .about 10 feet, and then a. j-og to the
north to within a few feet of the spur track (Ab. 90-91,
102-3, 106, 119, 123). The man who removed the platform when it was replaced by the 'concrete, and wlho was
a thoroughly disinterested witness not employed by any
of the defendants, testified that he measured the stringers
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which supported the flooring of the platform at its westerly extremity when he removed them, a~nd t!hat they
measured 32 feet in length. He testified that there were
two stringers butted end to end and set into the wall of
the warehouse building at right angles to and running
north from the building w.all, and that one of such stringers so butted end to end was 18 feet and the 1otlher 14 feet
in length, making the platform at this westerly edge 32
feet in width (Ab. 103). The platform would have had
to have been of approximately this size in order to have
permitted the use which was admittedly made of it, and
which use, in addition to tlhe pushing of meat trucks and
the like over it, weighing ,operations and the like, included the backi,ng up to the platform at its westerly edge
of as many as six wagons for loading and unloading purposes (Ab. 94), and the above recited physical facts and
the language in the reservation itself show the platform
to have 1been of .appr,oximately this size. 'Even plaintiff's
O\Yn witnesses, Snow and Evans, admitted that at a point
a slhort distance east of the we.sterly edge ·of the platform,
it was at least 25 to 30 feet in width, and that it followed the curve of the track (Ab. 128, 131, 133-4).
From this evidence, ·coupled with the physical fa,cts
and the language ,of the reservation itself, we submit that
the only reasonable conclusion deducible is that the old
platform in its westerly ·course followed the curve of the
spur to the north and was of the width testifie-d by defendants' witne·sses, namely, about 32 feet at its westerly
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tremity as recited in the reser~atioon itself. It may b€
noted that th~ platform at its easterly extremity is not
now as much as 10 feet in width, nor is it as wide throughout what remains of it as when originally constructed,
for the reason, as shown by the uncontradicted evidence,
that it was cut off all al,ong its length on the spur track
side to afford better clearance for tihe cars on the spur
and the men handling the same (Ab. 113, 123).
In his findi,ngs, however, the trial ·court departed entirely from and completely disregarded the evidenee in
the case, and by metes and bounds has described a platform set back at its westerly edge 7.3 feet from the property line, and which it is recited to be or to have been 10.7
feet wide at its westerly extremity and for .34 feet east
thereof, and then jogging out to the north 14.6 feet to a
total width at that point of 25.3 feet, and then following
along the track t,o- the east to a width of 5 feet at its easterly end (F. of F. No. 13 .and C. of L·. No.2). The Court
may search the record from end to end and it will not
find any testimony of any such dimensions, or that the
platform was ,o.f the size so described in tihe Findings,
Conclusions and Decree. ·Obviously, these dimensions
were obtained and made de hors the record by someone
after the case w.as tried and the 'eourt had announced his
decision. That this was the .case was virtually admitted
by -counsel for plaintiff upon the hearing of the motion
for a new trial (Ab. 177-180). At this time counsel admitted that .a. survey of the property had been made after
the court had announced his decision and measurements
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made to obtain the dimensions used in the Findings and
Decree. Counsel also elaimed tJha t the s·o-called railroad
and insurajnce maps (Ex. "L", "M'', "N'', "0", "P'',
'' Q'' and '' R '') were also used to obtain such dimensions.
As we shall hereinafter point out, these nl,aps were not
properly identified or authenticated to be received as
substantive evidence. There was no evidence that they
were or pretended t,o be accurate. Tihe makers of the maps
were not produced and no one competent to speak authenticated them, and the~· were received in evidence by
the court over defenda,nts' objections as illustra.tive
merely of the testimony of plaintiff and his witnesses
(Ab. 84-5-6). Xotwithstanding they were not and could
not be received .as substantive evidenee, the Court, under
counsel's own admission, in making his Findings and Decree~ has so used the maps and has also used other dimensions abtained by ·someone after the trial of the case,
and which some01le defendants had no ·opportunity to
cross-examine as to such claimed dimensions and measurements or the making thereof. If such proeedure is to be
permitted in the trial of cases in a court of justice, we
might as well flatly alhandon all rule·s of evidence and
trial procedure and any pretext of a fair and impartial
determination ,of the rights of litigants. It is submitted
that the Findings .and Conclusions so made and the Decree thereon cannot be permitted to stand.
The Finding.s, ·Conelusions and Decree herein, attempting to lin1it the· size of the platform defendants are
entitled to 1naintain on plaintiff's property, are a plain
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

44

attempt to rewrite the grants and reservations in the
deeds under which the parties claim and to relieve the
plaintiff's property of the major portion ·of the burden
thereby imposed upon the same, and ought not, we submit, to be permitted to stand.
POINT D.
Within due time and the order of the
Court (Tr. 103-4) after servi·ce 10f the Findings and Decree proposed by plaintiff, and under date of August 7,
1'939, defendants made objections and proposed proper
amendments to the Findings, Conclusions and Decree as
so proposed (Ab. 1'61-68) to make the same conform to
law and the facts and evidence in the case, but disregarding and without ruling and passing upon or giving defendants any opportunity to be heard upon such objections and proposed amendments, the trial court under
date ,of August 14, 1939, .signed and filed Findings and
De,cree as proposed by plaintiff (Alb. 169).

While there is apparently no statute expressly providing for the making of objections and tlhe proposal of
amendments to Findings and Decree as proposed by the
prevailing party, the losing party unquesti1ona.bly has
the inherent right to do so, and to be heard upon the objections and amendments which he makes and proposes
and in respect to the settlement of the Findings and Decree in the ·case ; and the Tihird District Court has recognized and provided £or the exercise of ·such right by the
adoption of a rule {13) providing in part that after service of a proposed draff of Findings and Decree by the
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sufficient or not in accordance with the Judge's de1cision,
he may, within twenty-four hours, or such further time
as the Judg-e may on application allow, specify his objections thereto tog-ether with such amendments as he
may deem proper to make the draft conform to the
Judge'·s decision, serve a ·copy there,of upon opposing
counsel, and likewise deliver the original, with proof of
service to the Judge, or in his absenee, to the Clerk for
him. The Judge may thereupon designate a time WJhen
he will settle the same, and at the time so appointed, the
draft so prepared together with objections and amendments so proposed, will be considered and s-ettled by the
Judge, etc.''
This Court has held that it is error to fail or refuse
to rule upon a motion to strike, and upon a. motion to
strike a 'cost bill, as well as to make proper Findings,
Conclusions and Decree when requested so to do. Petty
v. St. George Garage Co., 60 Utah 126, 130-131; Openshww v. Openshaw, 86 Utah 229, 232-3.
It should require no authority to sustain the proposition that a party is entitled to notice of and an opportunity to be heard on ,objections made to proposed
and requested action by the Court in the case, including
as here notice of and an opportunity to be heard concerning the settlement of Findings, Conclusions and Deeree in the ·case, where, as 'here, those pr,oposed 1by the
prevailing party are objected to and amendments thereto are proposed. Instead of requiring notice of the
settlement of such Findings and Decree, and affording
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defendants an opportunity to be heard thereon, and upon
their objections and proposed amendments, 'the trial
rcourt erroneously and without any hearing-, and without
ruling upon such objecti1ons and proposed amendments,
signed and filed the Findings and Decree as proposed
by plaintiff, which are, as previously pointed out, not at
all in a:ceord with the judgment or decree which was
ordered by the Court upon his consideration :of the case
(Ab. 139). It is submitted that the Court erred in fail·
ing and refusing to rule upon defendants' objections and
proposed amendments, and in signing the Findings and
Decree without ruling thereon, as well as in failing to
sustain the .objections made and to allow the amendments
propos·ed, which were proper and conformed to the law
and the evidence in the case.
POINT E.
A·s previously pointed out, the trial court,
over defendants' repeated objetctions, received in evi·
dence and permitted counsel for plaintiff to examine
plaintiff and his witnesses, and to cross-examine defendants' witnesses upon Exhibits "L", "M", "N",
"0'', "P", "Q" and "R", whicih are claimed to be maps
or drawings of the property and some of the buildings,
the railroad spur and other improvements upon the pr:operty in question. These maps and drawings were not
identified or authenticated by the makers thereof, or by

anyone who knew or pretended to know anything whatsoever about them.

X o w·itne.ss authorized to speak

testified or vouched for their correctness or aceuracy,
and nothing was shown concerning the purpose for which
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they "·ere prPpa red or anything- about their preparation.
It was not even shown that· they 'Zcere or purported to be
maps or drawings of the property in question except by
the unfounded and unsupported statements of witnesses,
who neither knew nor professed to know anytihing about
the same or their prepara.tion, or for that matter to have
ever seen the same before they were produced in court,
to the effect that the property and improvements in question looked like what the maps and drawings purported
to show.
It is elemental that before a map or drawing may be
received as substa;ntive a;n.d independent evidence, its
correctness and accuracy must be proved as a pre-requisite to it·s introduction. Young Mines Co. L'td. v.
Blackbu,rn, (Ariz.) 196 Pac. 167; Jordarn v. Duke, (Ariz.)
53 Pac. 197. While maps and drawings in some instances
may be admitted for illustrative purposes-that is to illustrate a witnesses testimony-without proof of their
accuracy .or .correctnes•s, they should even in such instances at least be shown to be maps or drawings of the
property or thing about which the witness is tes,tifying,
and should not be used or permitted to be used as evidence themselves or as the witnesses' testimony, or in
substitution f:or the witnesses' testimony.

The trial court in overruling some of defendants' objections and admitting tJhese exhibits in evidence, stated
that he was receiving them as illustrative only of the
witnesses' testimony (Ab. 85, 86), 1but notwithstanding
that none of these maps or drawings were referred to in
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the examinat~on of defendants' witness·es, he permitted
counsel for plaintiff to -cross-examine such witnesses
thereon (Ab. 113, 116, 117), and in considering the case,
and in the Findings of Faci, Conclusions of Law and
Decree, he treated and considered the same as independent a;nd substantive evidence in the case, and predicated
some of ihis ~chief Findings and portions :of his Decree
squarely upon rthe maps and drawings, and the dimensions and figure'S therein shown.
As previously noted, -counsel for plaintiff, upon the
presentation of the motion for a new trial, affirmatively
admitted that these maps and drawings were us·ed to
provide certain of the metes and bounds description set
forth in the Findings, Conclusions and Decree. Counsel
admitted that such des-criptions were taken from these
maps and drawings, which he referred to as ''the railr,oad maps and the insurance maps in evidence' '-that
the figures appearing on these maps were used to make
up such descriptions, and ''in. some itnstances a sc·ale W"as
used to determi;ne them" (Ah. 178-180), and thus it appears that no matter what the court's purpos·e was in
receiving .such maps and drawings in evidence, they were
actually and in point of fact used as substantive and independent evidence in the ca·se, and the Findings and
Decree were actually predicated thereon.
It is our position that under the facts and showing
in the case, these maps and drawings were not receivable
for any purpose-they were not receivable as any wit-

nesses' testimony, and it was improper and erroneous
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for the court to permit cross-examination of defendants'
witnesses thereon as was done-but even if ·such maps
and drawings could have been properly received to illustrate the testimony of the witnesse·s who testified concerning them, they were not receivable as substantive or
independent evidence. A·s above stated, there was no
evidence or showing that such maps and drawings were
correct and accurate, and it was, therefore, prejudicial
error •to receive the same in evidence a·s and to trea.t
the same as substantive and independent evidence, and
to base the Findings and Decree thereon, and such Findings and Decree ·SO based thereon, therefore, ought not
to be permitted to stand.
OONCLUBION.

F. As hereinbefore pointed out, the trial
court in his Findings and Decree herein has disregarded
and found contrary to the express terms and provisi1ons
of the grants and reservations in the deeds in question,
and has disregarded and found contrary to the admitted
facts and undisputed testimony in the case, and has entered a Decree herein whi1ch is plainly erroneous and contrary to law and the admitted facts ~and evidence in the
ease.
POINT

This Court has repeatedly held that a trial court
IS not at li,berty to disregard undisputed documentary
and other evidence in the case, or to ignore admitted facts
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trary thereto. As said by this Court in Wilcox v. Cloward,
et al., 88 Utah 503;

''The trial cowrt is not at liberty to disregarrd
creditable, UJ'n).contradicted, wnimpeached, or unimpaired evidence and 'make a. findvn.g contra;ry thereto. Parker v. Weber Cownty Irrigation District,
68 Utah 472, 251 P. 11."
To like effect see Gia.uque v. Salt Lake City, 42 Utaih
89; Eastrnan v. Gu.rrey, 15 Utah 410; Hathaway v. United
Tintic Mines Co., 42 Utah 520; Spring Creek Irr. Co. v.
Zollinger, 58 Utah 90; Rick v. W eUs Fargo Co., 39 Utah
130; and Parker v. Weber County Irr. Dist., 68 Utah 472.
This, we submit, is exactly what the trial court did
in this ~ca.se, in a. plain and p•alpable intent to rewrite the
terms of the grants and reservations ·of defendants' easements, rights of way and other rights and privileges over
and in and concerning pl~aintiff's property, and to thereby
relieve the same of the major portion of the burden impos·ed upon such pr1operty by such grant.s and reservations.
As said In Hathaway v. United Tintic Mines Co.,
supra:
"The finding of ~acts and entering of judgments
are .solemn act.s, and no eourt ·should permit itself
to make a finding of fact where the record is conclusive, as in this case, that there is absolutelY
~
no evidenee to support such finding. ''
For the reasons and booause of the manif~t errors
assigned and hereinbefore pointed out, we submit that
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the judgment and decree appealed from is erroneous,
contrary to law and the evidence in the case, and .should
be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
HURD

& HURD,

MoYLE, RICHARDs

&

McKAY,

JuDD, RAY, QuiNNEY

&

NEBEKER,

Attorneys for Appella;rds.
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